assumption that you have knowledge of your approximate birth rank. I will demonstrate that the Doomsday argument can still be given in a situation where you have no knowledge of your birth rank.
As I will show, this allows one to reply to Bostrom's (2001 Bostrom's ( , 2002 defense of the Doomsday argument against the refutation suggested by Dieks (1992) , and independently developed by Kopf et. al. (1994) and Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) .
The Doomsday argument runs as follows (following Bostrom 2001) . Suppose that you have narrowed the possibilities for doom down to two: represent the possibilities that doom will come soon and that doom will come late, the hypotheses should be understood as agreeing on the number of humans that exist up to now and into the short-term future; they disagree only about how many humans will exist in the long-term future.
After considering the various ways in which human life might end, you assign the following probabilities: . Call that property t, and let T be the proposition that someone has property t. Before 20:42 I did argument shifts probabilities in favor of H 1 , and these two shifts cancel each other out. Bostrom has recently argued against this reply to the Doomsday argument by presenting a scenario for which he claims that the SIA leads to unintuitive results. I will defend the SIA and Bartha and Hitchcock's reply. Bostrom's (2001, 383; 2002, Chapter 7) scenario is as follows. It is the year 2100, and physicists assign probability 0.5 each to theories T 1 and T 2 . T 1 entails that there are a total of a trillion trillion observers, while T 2 entails that there are a total of a trillion trillion trillion observers. We do not know our birth ranks, even approximately. Physicists are going to do an experiment to decide between T 1 and T 2 , but before they do a presumptuous philosopher explains that there is no need for the physicists to do the experiment. The presumptuous philosopher says that since he exists, that makes it more likely that there are more observers -T 2 is a trillion times more likely than T 1 .
Bostrom's idea here is that, since we have no knowledge of our birth ranks in this scenario, we can only get the first probability shift via the SIA in favor of more observers; we cannot get the second Doomsday shift in favor of fewer observers. But as I have shown, the Doomsday argument can be given even when we have no knowledge of our birth rank. We would have to specify that T 1 and T 2 agree on the number of observers existing in some appropriate spacetime region, but this is a legitimate assumption to make. (We can pick the region such that, if the hypotheses disagreed, then in principle it would be easy to falsify one of them, by checking population figures.) Thus, Bostrom's scenario does not show the unreasonableness of the SIA, and Bartha and Hitchcock's reply to the Doomsday argument is unrefuted.
